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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this “viewpoint” is to consider developments in the governance 
practices in UK public organizations, showing how ideas from the governance of listed 
companies have translated into public bodies. 
Design/methodology/approach – It discusses the literature of corporate governance and public 
service motivation and reflects it against practice evidenced in documentation for the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, codes for boards of different levels of public organizations, 
and both formal and informal evaluations of practice. 
Findings – The use of independent, non-executives directors in public bodies encapsulates 
the tension in the private sector between the service role of directors and how they control 
managers. The paper gives a preliminary investigation of three public bodies, comparing 
how reform of their governance has affected tensions in accountability and director 
motivation. The changes involve greater emphasis on extrinsic goals, potentially at the cost 
of the intrinsic ones. 
Research limitations/implications – The paper suggests avenues for future research, linking 
notions of the tensions between the service and control functions in corporate governance 
with the balance between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. 
Practical implications – Directors in both public and private bodies face a need to hold at bay 
forces that push in opposing directions to accommodate demands for greater accountability 
while sustaining the altruism social mindedness. 
Originality/value – The area of public sector boards is undergoing considerable change in the 
UK and this paper, although preliminary, is one of the few to examine the links to 
motivation. 
Something had to be done 
In May 2009 – in the depths of what we came to call the Great Recession and after years of 
obstruction from government and parliament – the Daily Telegraph newspaper in the UK 
published a series of articles based on leaked documents concerning abuses of expense 
claims by members of parliament from all the major parties. The details were shocking, even 
lurid: Mortgages on houses for MPs paid from the public purse, but then let out, to the MP’s 
personal gain; a duck house – a duck mansion, really – built in the garden of an MP’s stately 
home; pornographic movie rentals. Something had to be done. 
In central government departments – after decades of failed attempts to trim costs and in the 
face of deficits ballooning because of bank bailouts – the trajectory of public spending was 
clearly unsustainable. Procurement for defence in particular seemed out of control, welfare 
budgets were climbing with the economic slowdown, and – worryingly for the long term – 
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baby-boomers were heading into retirement on under- or unfunded pension plans. 
Something had to be done.  
In public sector bodies, those delivering services to the public, the crisis was no less acute. In 
health, for example, care for the elderly faced impossible projections of future service 
requirements at a time when budgets needed to decline in real, in per capita and perhaps 
even in nominal terms. Something had to be done.  
Moreover, the climate of cuts made inevitable by the demographics was exacerbated by the 
sense among the public at large that some people – the demonized bankers, yes, but also 
those in power in parliament, at the top of government departments and at the head of 
public sectors bodies – were getting away with daylight robbery. A lack of accountability 
threatened to de-motivate those working throughout the public service system. Something 
had to be done.  
It came in the form of importing an alien concept, a system of board-level governance 
developed in the private sector and in particular for corporations listed on stock exchanges: 
the independent, non-executive director. Whether it improves performance through lower 
costs or greater efficiency has proved difficult to assess, but it has had one benefit: A 
heightened sense of accountability and greater debate in the boardrooms of public bodies. 
But at what cost to motivation of the members of public boards? 
Motivation and directors 
“Serving on a [corporate] board is like taking on a position in public 
service. It is not (and should not be) a wealth creation opportunity but a 
chance to play a role in the proper workings of our marketplace” – Peter 
Weinberg, partner at Perella Weinberg Partners, a boutique investment 
bank (Weinberg, 2006). 
The quote from Peter Weinberg suggests that the motivation of directors, even in the 
corporate sector, may not be as self-serving as envisaged in theories based on rational 
choice. For many serving of public sectors boards, the same is true.  
The quote also echoes the broader conceptualizations of public service motivation, such as 
the “general, altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a 
nation or humankind” (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999, p. 23) or the “beliefs, values and attitudes 
that go beyond self-interest and organizational interest” (Vandenabeele, 2007, p. 547). 
Moreover, these are autonomous motivations. Yet the question remains whether they can be 
crowded out by the extrinsic ones (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Le Grand, 2003).  
Four systems 
To examine the governance of those involved in governmental activities, let’s review the 
mechanisms used to hold public organizations to account. We start with a brief discussion of 
private sector arrangements in the UK Corporate Governance Code before reviewing how 
governance operates in three levels of the public sector: the health service, central 
government departments in Whitehall, and then in parliament itself. 
Governing the corporation 
Since 1992, Britain has operated a system of corporate governance rooted in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, a voluntary set of principles for boards of listed companies. 
The first version, the Cadbury Code, retained the traditional UK unitary board, comprising 
executives and outside, non-executive directors, but it gave the latter particular powers. And 
it separated the role of chief executive from the chairman to prevent any one person having 
“unfettered powers of decision” (Section 4.9, Cadbury, 1992). But these non-executives have 
to work with complex motivations associated with their dual roles: “service”, which 
involves helping the executives find solutions and identify scarce resources, and “control”, 
monitoring the performance of executives and applying sanctions. 
Governing health 
Britain’s National Health Service may look monolithic from the outside, but it is a complex 
system of public and private bodies, most called “trusts”, subject to repeated reform 
attempts over the years. Early reforms involved bringing outsiders into the boardroom of 
NHS bodies, in particular the hospitals, for the purpose of providing guidance on 
commercial practice (“service”) and to foster internal, non-clinical challenge (“control”) to 
NHS managers. Over the years and explicitly modelled on a major reform of the UK code of 
corporate governance, the role and number of these non-executive directors has increased 
(NHS Appointments Commission, 2003). Evidence suggests the non-executives have had an 
impact on monitoring the executives, the “control” function, while attention to strategic 
issues, the “service” function, faltered (ICSA, 2011). In a sense, therefore, these reforms seem 
to have focused on adding extrinsic motivations of targets and budget, while potentially 
disrupting intrinsic ones.  
Governing government 
To improve their efficiency and accountability, the coalition government of Conservative 
and Liberal Democrats accepted guidance from Lord Browne, a former chief executive of the 
oil company BP, and issued a code of “corporate governance” for government departments 
(UK Government, 2011). Ministers replaced senior civil servants as chairs of these boards, 
which had the effect of separating the role of chair and chief executive, in parallel to the 
corporate sector. The reform also introduced non-executive directors to bring an outside, 
independent voice into discussions of process and operations.2 Policy remains in the hands 
of ministers. These non-executives have their own club, a forum in which they share ideas, 
led a “Government Lead NED” in the person of Lord Browne.  
Gains came in advice on potential improvements in purchasing (a “service” role), but 
anecdotal evidence suggests top civil servants resent the changes, which made them easier 
to replace but also had the potential to undermine their non-partisanship (signs of a 
“control” function), a sign that extrinsic motivating factors might be gaining more attention 
at the expense of intrinsic ones. In the first year, the reforms achieved little of their stated 
aims (Browne, 2013). 
Governing parliament 
The job of parliament is to scrutinize government. Its governance arrangements differ again 
from those of government and public organizations. The Chief Clerk of the House of 
Commons serves as both chief executive of the House Service and chair of its management 
board. But the House Service does not have the unitary board of the other systems reviewed 
here. Instead it reports to a Commission made up of MPs under the chairmanship of the 
Speaker of the House.  
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The UK Parliament’s management board is different. The Commission may have public 
legitimacy as elected officials, but they are also both customers of the House Service. And as 
politicians they have the potential to undermine the impartiality of the House Service. These 
conflicts of interest became most obvious in the expenses scandal, when the House Service 
was seen to have failed to challenge elected members of the Commons.  
What emerged were new governance arrangements, including first one and then a second 
non-executive on the management board of the House of Commons and an independent 
auditor of member spending (UK Parliament, 2013). The non-executives give a business 
orientation to a management team largely insulated from the discipline of markets (a 
“service” function). It remains to be seen the extent to which having non-executives 
enhances the board’s “control” side. Anecdotal evidence suggests these still new changes in 
the House Service have brought some greater emphasis on extrinsic motivations with 
uncertain implications for the intrinsic ones.  
Motivation and accountability 
The central problem in corporate governance lies in the tension between “service” and 
“control” at board level. The control side finds its base in agency theory (Fama, 1980; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983) and its contention that managers (the “agent”) will act in a self-interested 
way, extracting personal value at the cost of owners (the “principal”).  
These assumptions run counter to those of stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), a 
theoretical stance with many echoes of public service motivation. Stewardship theory 
suggests that most of the time, most managers try to do a good job. The corporate 
governance literature suggests that attention to agency theory focuses senior management 
and non-executive directors alike on extrinsic and often short-term targets, while 
deemphasizing achievement of the intrinsic satisfaction associated with decisions made for 
the longer term and greater good of the company. 
Roberts (2009) argues part of “intelligent accountability” requires responsiveness 
“socializing” accountability. Within the boardroom, among challenging but collegial peers, 
such socializing accountability represents a form that binds members of a board together 
(Roberts, 1991, 2001). Could fostering that “socializing” accountability be an antidote for 
some of this tensions in roles and an antidote to the effects when extrinsic goals crowd out 
intrinsic motivations?  
Non-executives on boards of both private and public sector bodies tend to be drawn from 
elites, and they meet only episodically. Moreover, they typically spend only part of their 
effort on any one organization’s board and cross-fertilize their ideas as they move from 
board to board. They are therefore likely to be able to resist the effects of crowding out of 
intrinsic motivations. Fostering the socializing type of accountability may help them to hold 
at bay the contradictions of agency and stewardship theory and sustain broader, social and 
even altruistic imperatives in the face of pressure of externally promoted performance 
targets. The presence of public service motivation among directors of public sector 
organizations would seem only to enhance that ability.  
But there is a problem: Agency and stewardship views are incompatible in practice as well 
as theory. If stewardship theory applies to the work of managers, and the board that 
assumes agency theory applies, the organization runs the risk of demotivating in particular 
senior management and the professional staff. But when managers act like agents, a board 
that assumes stewardship is following a recipe for disaster. For the public sector and in areas 
where public service motivation is strong, importing extrinsic targets risks crowding out 
intrinsic motivations. Table 1 summarizes the tensions and motivations across the four 
organizational forms examined here. 
Table 1 - Governance tensions and motivations compared 
 Corporate NHS Whitehall House of Commons 
Tensions Tension between 
“service” and 
“control” 
functions 
Tension between 
“clinical” 
expertise, 
managerial power; 
non-executive 
local politics 
Tension between 
civil service 
independence, 
political authority, 
business efficiency 
With emphasis to 
date on “service” 
role of non-
executives, tension 
between 
professional and 
political 
imperatives held 
at bay 
Motivations Extrinsic goals 
dominate 
governance 
reforms, but 
stewardship 
approaches rely on 
intrinsic ones  
Extrinsic ones risk 
crowding out 
intrinsic ones 
(care; professional 
prerogatives) 
Extrinsic 
budgetary targets 
risk crowding out 
intrinsic ones (civil 
service 
independence; 
good of the 
country) 
Extrinsic targets 
increasing, but 
predominance of 
old ways of 
working, 
reinforced by 
intrinsic 
motivations, create 
resistance to 
change  
Conclusions 
The board level problem in the public sector is that of balancing conflicting aims. On the one 
hand, boards must recognize the need to meet external imperatives that can run counter to 
the motivations that led to the attraction and retention of key staff motivated by a desire to 
serve a larger social purpose than budgetary targets can inscribe. On the other, they need to 
foster that internal drive for altruism that resists market-based approaches. Holding both in 
mind is similar to, but also different from, balancing the demands for service and control.  
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